This paper is a pioneering study on the estimation of Grossman and Lai's (2004) gametheoretic model of international patent protection. The model yields clear predictions of the variation in degrees of patent protection across countries based on the market sizes and levels of innovative capability of the countries, and interdependence of the degrees of patent protection between countries. To correctly take into account the interaction between countries, we borrow an approach from the spatial econometrics literature. We find that the pattern of patent protection around the globe was broadly consistent with the predictions of the non-cooperative game model before the early 1990s. As conjectured, the non-cooperative game model was less applicable after the early 1990s, in view of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.
Introduction
Intellectual property protection (IPR) comes to the forefront of international trade negotiations nowadays. Since the early 1990s, the US and other EU countries began to exert ever higher pressure for other countries to adopt more stringent standards in protecting patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, geographical indications, new plant varieties and other biotechnological products in the real as well as cyber-world. These efforts culminated in the signing of the TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property) Agreement of the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1994. By January 1, 1996, all developed countries were required to adopt the universal minimum IPR standards; by January 2000, all developing and transition economies were required to adopt the same standards; and by January 2006, the poorest countries should also adopt these standards (2016 for pharmaceutical patent protection).
It is obvious that TRIPS has enormous income distribution implications among countries in the world. McCalman (2001) found that the US was by far the largest beneficiary of TRIPS (4.6 billion USD), followed by Germany (0.79 billion USD) and France (0.57 billion USD) as distant second and third beneficiaries. On the other hand, the greatest loser was Canada (1 billion USD), followed by Brazil (0.93 billion USD) and UK (0.54 billion USD). Obviously, many countries are reluctant to adopt the standards stipulated by TRIPS had there not been quid pro quo in other trade or non-trade issues.
Countries have long sought to coordinate on their intellectual property policies, but virtually all international agreements on IPR lacked any binding power, until the signing of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994. For example, the Paris Convention (1883) for the protection of industrial property and the Berne Convention (1886) for the protection of artistic and literary property (mainly copyrights), both managed by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), had been in place for a long time. Yet, the lack of a dispute settlement mechanism rendered the treaties rather toothless. On the other hand, using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the US had been able to pressure South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Thailand, Taiwan and China to adopt stronger IPR legislations in the 1990s, while the EU had been able to pressure Egypt and Turkey to do the same during the same period (Maskus 2000) . Therefore, intuitive reasoning points to the hypothesis that countries by and large behaved non-cooperatively in setting their strengths of patent protection before the beginning of the 1990s; and then they became more and more cooperative over time in the 1990s as the US, and to a lesser extent, the EU, exerted more and more pressure on other countries to strengthen their patent protection. This culminated in the signing of the TRIPS agreement in 1994, which called for some universal minimum standards regarding intellectual property protection to be adopted by all members of the WTO. This paper focuses on testing the empirical implications of the game-theoretic model of intellectual property protection developed by Grossman and Lai (2004) . We focus on patent protection in this paper, and leave the research into other important aspects of intellectual property (IP) protection, such as trademarks and copyrights, to later studies.
Specifically, we are interested in knowing whether the variation in the degrees of patent protection across countries, in the absence of binding international cooperation such as the TRIPS, can be explained by the Grossman-Lai model. Then, we ask whether TRIPS agreement has really led to cooperative increase in patent protection in all countries beyond the incentive for countries to protect patents non-cooperatively. Grossman and Lai (2004) propose a theoretical framework for explaining the variation in degrees of patent protection across countries as the outcome of a non-cooperative Nash game with national governments as players choosing the degrees of patent protection.
The Grossman-Lai model yields clear predictions of the variation in degrees of patent protection across countries based on the market sizes and levels of innovative capability of the countries as well as interdependence of the degrees of patent protection between countries. These hypotheses are tested using spatial econometric technique. We find that the pattern of patent protection around the globe is broadly consistent with the predictions of the non-cooperative game model in 1980, 1985 and 1990 . We also find that the model is less applicable to the years 1995 and 2000, which is consistent with our conjecture that countries in the world became more cooperative in providing patent protection after the TRIPS agreement was signed.
The significance of this study lies not only in its validation of the Grossman-Lai model, but also that it provides evidence that the degrees of patent protection adopted by countries are guided by economic considerations of marginal costs and marginal benefits as economic theory predicts. Furthermore, the study provides evidence that countries behaved strategically in determining their domestic strength of patent protection absent any binding international agreements.
In the literature, there are a number of empirical studies on the determinants of patent protection. Two examples are Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and Ginarte and Park (1997) . A distinguishing feature of the present paper is that it is based on a fully specified theoretical model. The econometric estimations are tightly guided by the variables, the functional form and the game-theoretic structure of the theoretical model. Nevertheless, the findings of this paper are fairly consistent with the findings of the studies in the literature. Using linear regression, studies in the existing literature similarly find that proxy for market size (like GDP) and proxy for innovative capability (like the share of scientists and engineers in the labor force or the ratio of R&D to GDP) are significant in explaining the variation of the strengths of patent protection across countries. These studies, however, typically do not have a fully specified theory to guide their estimations.
In Section 2, we briefly describe the theory, which basically draws from Grossman and Lai (2004) . We then partially linearize the main equation so as to allow us to apply spatial econometrics technique to test the hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the estimation procedure using spatial econometrics approach, discuss the results and test the predictive power of the structural model. Section 4 augments the spatial econometrics model in Section 3 by taking into account the depth of trade relationship between country pairs in determining the interdependence of their strengths of patent protection. Section 5 concludes.
The Theory
The theory we want to test comes directly from Grossman and Lai (2004) . For detail of the model, the reader should refer to the paper directly. Here is a summary of the assumptions and features of the model, with the assumptions being set in italics.
1. Consumers decide how much of each good to purchase given their budget constraint.
Given there is international trade, they would benefit whenever there are more inventions from any country in the world.
2. The value of a firm's patent increases as the degree of patent protection in any of its markets increases. The value of the patent also increases with the size of each market.
When the value of a patent increases, there is more incentive to invent. Therefore, there would be more inventions from all countries whenever the market size or the degree of protection of any country increases.
3. Each government chooses the degree of patent protection to maximize the present discounted value of the sum of consumer surplus and the returns to capital (firm owners are owners of capital), given the degree of patent protection of other countries. Given the behavior of the consumers and the firms mentioned above, each government can figure out its own best response function.
4. Firms and government are forward-looking. When evaluating costs and benefits, they would take into account the present discounted value of them. Consumers simply maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint in each period.
5.
When a government announces a change of the degree of patent protection at time 0, the new policy only applies to inventions that take place after time 0. Old inventions are subjected to whatever patent policy was in effect at the time of invention.
6. It is assumed that agents believe that the relative market size M i /M j and relative number of inventions I i /I j (for all countries i 6 = j ) remain more or less constant in the future.
According to Grossman and Lai (2004) , in the absence of international cooperation, countries play a Nash game in setting the degree of patent protection. The optimal degree of patent protection for a country depends on the degrees of patent protection of all other countries in the world that trade with it. The best response function of a country is obtained by choosing the degree of protection such that the marginal cost of extending protection is equal to the marginal benefit of extending protection, given the degrees of protection of all other countries. Consider the choice of P i , the degree of enforcement of patent protection at any moment in country i, by the government of that country. We can think of this degree as the fraction of country i's market where patent protection is enforced. It is an index of the degree of patent protection. This country bears two costs from increasing the degree of enforcing patents slightly. First, it increases the fraction of the market that suffers a static deadweight loss of C c on each good that was invented in other countries but sold in country i. Notice that the profits earned by foreign producers in country i are not an offset to this latter marginal cost, because they accrue to patent holders in foreign countries. On the other hand, the marginal benefit that comes to country i from strengthening patent protection reflects the increased incentive that foreign and domestic firms have to engage in R&D. If the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection at time t, P it , is positive and less than 1, then the marginal benefit per consumer of increasing P it must match the marginal cost, which implies the following best response function
where I it is the number of inventions made by residents of country i, and N is the set of all countries in the world that produce or trade patent-sensitive goods. Because our sample contains all the major countries that produce and trade patent-sensitive goods, it should be a good proxy for N .
1 Therefore, we shall treat N as the set of our sample countries hereinafter. It is assumed that a firm in country i makes the same profit per consumer π i regardless of where it sells its product. This would be true if manufacturing of a good is done in the country where it is invented using that country's labor and capital. T is the present discounted value of one dollar over the life time, τ , of a product, or
The above best response function further implies that
where M it is the number of consumers of patent-sensitive goods in country i; v jt = T π j P k∈N M kt P kt is the value of a global patent for a firm from country j; and γ j is the elasticity of I jt with respect to v jt . That is,
. It stands for the responsiveness of innovation in country j to changes in the value of a patent (in elasticity form)
held by a typical firm from country j. In deriving the above best response function, we assume that agents expect I it /I jt and M it /M jt to stay constant over time for all i 6 = j.
Once these assumptions are made, it is easy to show that the current year M it and I it values are sufficient for calculating the present discounted value of the marginal cost and benefit. The intersection of all the best response functions gives the set of equilibrium degrees of patent protection of the non-cooperative game.
We can re-write the above best response function as
where N = total number of countries in N . It is assumed that
for all i. This assumption would be valid if the elasticities of demand in 1 As long as the countries in N that are excluded from our sample all have very small I so that P j I j (where j ∈ {sample countries}) ≈ P j∈N I j , and the excluded countries are so insignificant that changes in M , I, and P of these countries have little effect on the IP protection of the included countries, we can take the set of our sample countries as a good proxy for N .
all markets are equal. The above equation is the core equation of the theory. It can be easily seen that a country with larger market (M i ) or more patented inventions (I i ) will protect patents more when we compare across countries at a certain point in time. We could estimate the above system of simultaneous equations if we are willing to assume that γ j are equal across countries. However, the errors incurred in doing so can be very large given the fact that we have a very diverse sample of countries, which can have very different γ j . Therefore, we transform the simultaneous equation system (1) into another system which does not require us to make any assumption about γ j . This is shown below.
The cost of doing this will be discussed in subsection 3.2.
Setting i = k in (1), summing over k on both sides for k ∈ N , and then re-arranging, we obtain
Hereinafter we drop the time subscript for simplicity of exposition. Substituting this expression into (1) for country i, and re-arranging, we obtain
We shall denote the operator P j∈N simply by P j . The above equation can be rewritten as
which can be further re-written as
where
Equation (2) defines the equilibrium patent protection of country i as a function of the market size and innovative capability variables as well as other countries' levels of patent protection. 2 It can be rewritten as
Using a first order Taylor's series expansion, we can linearize equation (3) as follows:
The derivation of the above equation is given in Appendix A. As M i refers to the number of consumers of patent-sensitive goods and is a hypothetical variable on which we do not have data, we proxy for it using the total consumption of the patent-sensitive goods Con i . The justification for it is discussed in Section 3.1.
As a result, eqt. (4) can be rewritten as
Equation (5) constitutes the basis of the estimations and predictions of this paper.
The terms associated with 
Since the weights w ik consist of B i which depends on an unknown parameter θ 2 with 0 < θ 2 < 1, we use three different values of θ 2 in the estimation. The values include θ 2 = 0.2 (a high demand elasticity scenario), θ 2 = 0.5 (a medium demand elasticity scenario) and θ 2 = 0.9 (a low demand elasticity scenario). As the strengths of patent protection of all countries are determined simultaneously in equilibrium, the variable associated with the levels of patent protection of other countries (
hand side of equation (5) This equation has three important implications which are stated in the following three propositions:
Proposition 1 When one compares across countries, the degree of patent protection of a country (P i ) increases with the market size of its patent sensitive industries relative to the total market size of its trade partners (
Con k ), holding the relative innovative capability constant.
Proposition 2
The degree of patent protection of a country (P i ) increases with the country's relative innovative capability (
), holding its relative market size constant.
Proposition 3
The welfare-maximizing policy makers in any country take notice of the strengths of patent protection in other countries when determining the degree of domestic patent protection.
These three propositions are tested using equation (5) . In this equation, proposition 1 implies that the coefficient of
(β 1 ) should be negative, proposition 2 implies that the coefficient of
should be positive while proposition 3 implies that the spatial interactive coefficient ρ should be nonzero (in fact positive in the present case).
After carrying out the hypothesis testing in subsection 3.2, we calculate the in-sample and out-of-sample predictions of the model and gauge its performance in the various years in subsection 3.3. Besides comparing the mean squared errors of the predictions, we also investigate if there is any evidence that more countries adopted stronger patent protection than the level predicted by the model after the implementation of TRIPS.
Data
Years of study : 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 What are patent-sensitive sectors?
The list of patent-sensitive sectors is given in Table 1 (2000).
Steady state and Time lag
The original model of Grossman and Lai (2004) is a dynamic one. It assumes that a government maximizes the present discounted value of the net social welfare of the country by choosing an optimal degree of patent protection, given the optimal strengths of patent protection chosen by all other countries. The Grossman-Lai model assumes that M i and I i are constant over time for all countries. As a result, there is a steadystate dynamic equilibrium with endogenous, time-invariant {P i } i∈N , which is a function of {M i } i∈N and {I i } i∈N . In reality, the data show that M i , I i and P i are all changing over time, which obviously indicates that we cannot assume the world was in a steady state.
Nonetheless, we can justify the application of the model to analyze real world data by assuming that agents believe that M i /M j and I i /I j (i 6 = j) are stable in the future. Once this assumption is made, it is easy to show that {M i } i∈N and {I i } i∈N of the current year (or previous year if we allow for time-lag) are sufficient for calculating the best response functions that determine the equilibrium {P i } i∈N in that year. This relationship is shown in equation (1).
For each year, we use the average of the previous four years of M i and I i as the proxies for the explanatory variables. There are a couple of justifications for using that. First, because of legislative lag, the patent laws implemented in a certain year is more likely to be determined by market conditions in the last few years than by conditions in the same year.
This precludes the use of contemporaneous measures of M and I. Second, using lagged variables on the right hand side avoids endogeneity problem. For example, it is plausible that stronger patent protection (P i ) increases the contemporaneous number of patents granted to domestic residents (one measure of I i ). Such effect of the dependent variable on the explanatory variable causes endogeneity problem if contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables are used.
Data for the degree of patent protection
In the model, P i is literally the percentage of market of country i that receives patent protection during the lifetime of the product. One can also interpret it as the probability that patent rights are enforced at any given moment throughout the life of the product, or the percentage of time patent is protected during the lifetime of the product in country i. Basically, this is the degree of enforcement of patent protection in a country.
An example of how this degree of protection can be captured in the real world is given by Ginarte and Park (1997) We use a linear monotonic function of the GP Index to proxy for P . The choice of the GP index to proxy for the degree of patent protection can be subject to a few criticisms, but we believe this index is the best we can get to proxy for patent rights, and we can defend the use of it in our analysis. First, although the GP index can stand for the degree of patent protection in a country, it is an ordinal measure: a doubling of the index does not mean a doubling of the probability that patent rights are enforced. Therefore, the GP index should only be a monotonic transformation of the true P in our model. To address this concern, we assume the true P is an affine transformation of the GP index. We can interpret this form as a linearized version of the Taylor series approximation of the true non-linear transformation function between the GP index and the true P . Specifically, we assume that the true probability of enforcement of patent protection, P i , to be related to the GP index, GP i , by the linear approximation P i = a + b · GP i , where a is non-negative and b is a positive constant. It turns out that it does not matter whether we can observe the parameters a and b.
The second possible criticism of the use of the GP Index to stand for the degree of patent rights protection is that P should include not just the laws in the book, but also execution of the laws, which the GP index does not capture. Although execution of the laws is not captured by the index, Ginarte and Park argued from the evidence they gathered that "...the main complaints overall are not about the execution of patent laws, but of statutory and institutional differences which the indexes already reflect." For the purpose of this study, the data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 are used.
Data for the market size
As M i refers to the number of consumers of patent-sensitive goods and is a hypothetical variable on which we do not have data, we proxy for it using the total consumption of the patent-sensitive goods Con i . The UNESCO has data that allows us to calculate Con i . In the UNESCO dataset, it is defined that consumption = domestic production + imports -exports in each country i or
For each country i, we sum up the dollar values of the consumption variable in this dataset for all the patent-sensitive sectors to arrive at the value for Con i .
In using this variable as a proxy for M i , we need to face the issue that this proxy for M i is not the number of consumers or buyers but the expenditure by buyers. If prices are different across countries, then countries with lower price would show a higher expenditure even if the number of buyers are the same in all countries, as long as demand is elastic.
We could actually estimate the price elasticity of demand if we had data on the relative prices of patent-sensitive goods in all countries. The problem is that there are no data on these price indexes. A priori, it is not clear whether, for example, a developing country (LDC) would have a higher relative price for patent-sensitive goods than a developed country (DC), since two counteracting effects are present. On the one hand, the prices of the non-traded goods should be lower in a developing country, since wages are much lower there. On the other hand, tariffs and trade barriers in developing countries are usually higher, which tend to raise the prices of tradable goods above those in the developed world. Without more information, we can only conclude that prices in LDCs are equally likely to be higher or lower than in DCs. Consequently, it could well be true that prices of patent-sensitive goods do not differ very much across countries on the average. As mentioned above, we use the average of the previous four years' value of Con i , to proxy
Since the data essential for computing Con i , viz. Prod i , Im i and Ex i , are available only from a relatively small set of countries, we use instruments to proxy for this variable to augment the set of countries. To find such instruments, we regress the consumption of patent-sensitive goods on real GDP and real GDP per capita. We find that the R 2 is higher than 0.95 using pooled data for the years 1980, 1985 and 1990. So, we use the fitted expression as the proxy for the consumption of patent-sensitive goods in the country. A detail description of the steps is provided in Appendix C.
Data for I
In Grossman and Lai (2004), I is the number of useful commercializable patents obtained by the residents of a country in a given period. This reflects the number of patent-sensitive innovations and hence the innovative capability of the country. It is assumed in the model that all these innovations are equally valuable, and that a useful invention would be patented in all countries of the world.
We want to find a proxy for the number of patent-sensitive innovations that is comparable across countries. One option is to use an output measure -for example the number of patents granted to domestic residents. The shortcoming with this measure is that different countries have different criteria for granting patents. Some countries grant minipatents or utility models while others do not. Another problem with using the number of patents granted to domestic residents is the potential simultaneity/endogeneity problem, i.e. the degree of patent protection also affects the number of patents granted to domestic residents. Nonetheless, to address this simultaneity problem, we use lagged measures of the number of patents granted to domestic residents (the average of the previous four years).
We use the number of patents granted to domestic residents obtained from World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to proxy for the input measure of I. There are a few issues to be addressed when using this proxy. First, most patents are never put to commercial use, and therefore should not be counted. Our response is that as long as the number of useful patents is approximately a constant fraction of total patents, our proxy would be fine. Second, there is home bias in application for patents. For example, US citizens tend to apply only for US patents but not patents from other countries. Therefore, the assumption that every invention would obtain patents from all countries of the world may not be true. Our response is that, given that all countries exhibits home-bias, as long as the proportion of inventions that only apply for home patents is constant across countries, our proxy is proportional to the number of inventions that obtain patents in all of the (major) markets in the world . Third, not all patents generate the same commercial value. Some patents are much more valuable than others. Thus, the assumption that all consumers spend the same amount on each patented good is not valid. Our response is that we are looking at the average patent. We can treat a particularly high-value patent as equivalent to several or many average patents, while a particularly low-value patent as equivalent to a fraction of an average patent. If we further assume that the values of patents have about the same mean and variance across all countries, then the equivalent number of equally-valuable commercializable patents in a country would be proportional to the number of commercializable patents in that country. In summary, if the assumptions mentioned in the first, second and third points above are not too far from the fact, then the equivalent number of equal-value commercializable inventions that are patented in all the major markets would be proportional to the number of patents granted to domestic residents. Like in the case of M, proportionality of the proxy to the real variable is all we need, as can be seen from the inspection of (5).
The other option to proxy for the number of patent-sensitive innovations is to use some input measures -such as the share of scientist and engineers in the labor force (SciEng it /LF it ). The advantage of using such measure to proxy for the number of innovations is that they can avoid the endogeneity problem altogether. A higher SciEng it /LF it signifies that a higher fraction of labor force are engaged in creative innovation as opposed to minor non-patentable innovations or routine manufacturing activities. In fact, in Gross- In the estimation, we present the results for both the output and input measures of innovations.
Estimating the Structural Model Using Spatial Econometrics
One special contribution of the Grossman and Lai (2004) model is that it provides a specific functional form to describe how countries interacted in regard to patent protection and how the degrees of patent protection are related to the market sizes and levels of innovative capability of different countries. At the Nash equilibrium, the degrees of patent protection (P i ) across countries are determined by equation (5) . This is the core equation that forms the basis of the spatial estimation. Given equation (5), the equilibrium patent protection of country i is characterized by:
where X i = [1,
; ρ is the "spatial" dependence parameter which measures the extent of strategic interdependence across countries and w ik is the spatial weight assigned to the k th trading partner of country i. Based on the structural model, w ik is given by equation (6), with 0 < θ 2 < 1. As mentioned in Section 2, we do not attempt to estimate θ 2 as a parameter in the model. Instead, we tried three different values of θ 2 (0.2, 0.5 and 0.9) to conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to demand elasticity. The impact of changes in the market size and innovative capability on the equilibrium patent protection is investigated using the spatial equation This spatial system specifies how the change in the patent protection in any country affects the equilibrium patent protection of other countries. In other words, the spatial model setting implies that there is global interaction in the determination of patent protection. The welfare maximizing policy makers in any country take notice of the patent protection in other countries when determining the degree of domestic patent protection.
The spatial model is also used to estimate how the equilibrium strengths of patent protection are impacted by shifts in the reaction functions due to the variations in the market size and innovative capability variables.
Given the setting of the spatial model, equation (7) can be written in matrix form as:
where P N is a N × 1 vector of P i ; X N is a N × 3 matrix with row i being X i ; W N is a N × N matrix with the diagonal elements being 0 and the off-diagonal elements in row i and column k being w ik =
. The structure of the error term is specified as
However, note that equation (8) is originated from equation (2), the sum of which over all countries always gives an identity. Thus the system actually only consists of N − 1 linearly independent equations. This has an important econometric implication on the error terms as the sum of the error terms always equals to zero in the identity. This suggests that the variance-covariance matrix Ω N is singular. To handle this singularity problem, we need to drop an equation from (8) . We choose to drop the equation of the country whose patent protection index is closest to the mean, and this country turns out to be Philippines. We shall call it the benchmark country. We do not try to explain the level of patent protection of the benchmark country but will take it as given. We then estimate the remaining N − 1 linearly independent equations specified by equation (8) to obtain the estimates of β and ρ, taking into account the data of the benchmark country.
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By simple matrix manipulation, the N − 1 independent equations from (8) can be rewritten in the following reduced form:
where 
and Ω ≡ Ω −b .
The parameters [β, ρ, Ω] can be estimated by maximizing the following log-likelihood function for the joint distribution of P :
The maximization of the log-likelihood can be reduced to a simpler expression in the form of a concentrated likelihood function. The detailed steps in maximizing the concentrated likelihood are available in Anselin (1986) and summarized in Appendix B. 
Estimation Results Using Output Measure of Innovative Capability
The estimation results for the year 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 with θ 2 = 0.2, 0.5 and 0.9 are provided in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. The innovative capability measure (I i ) in these estimation are based on the output measure, that is, the number of patents granted to domestic residents. The estimation show that for the year 1980, 1985 and 1990, the coefficients of
(the output measure of the innovative capability of the model. The estimation results for the case of θ 2 = 0.5 are reported in Table 5 . is insignificant at even the 10 percent significance level, suggesting that the implication of the non-cooperative game model on the market size does not hold in these years. The spatial parameter even has the opposite sign to the predicted one.
In the pooled estimation, a fixed effect model is used. In addition, we use Zellner's SURE setting in the error term to allow for non-zero correlation between the error terms of a country in different time periods. The correlation structure across time is specified by the matrix Σ. For a three period pooled estimation Σ= 
Estimation Results Using Input Measure of Innovative Capability
To check if the results above are robust to alternative measure of innovative capability (I i ), Next, we calculate the predicted values of P i based on our estimated coefficients. By 5 The results are similar for all the cases of θ 2 = 0.2, 0.5 and 0.9. The estimation results for the case of θ 2 = 0.5 are provided in this paper. The estimation results for the cases of θ 2 = 0.2 and θ 2 = 0.9 are available upon request. 6 In the pooled estimation, the data is first grouped by country and then by time period.
doing this, we can gauge the predictive power of the model. Moreover, we can find out whether more countries behaved more cooperatively than predicted by the model after the implementation of the TRIPS, as we conjectured.
Testing the Predictive Power of the Structural Model 3.3.1 In-Sample Prediction
To obtain predictions based on the structural model, we make use of the reduced form of the spatial representation of equation (9) . Equation (9) implies
Equation (11) is the equation used in both the in-sample and out-of-sample prediction in this paper. Table 7 ). To test whether the MSE in,80,85,90 is too high (i.e. whether the structural model can explain the variation of the data), we use bootstrap method to infer the statistical significance of the MSE. First of all, we calculate the estimated MSE in,80,85,90 as described below (to simplify the notation, we define {T 1 } = {1980, 1985, 1990}):
and n is the total number of observations.
Then we re-sample the data as described by the bootstrap method explained in Appendix D. We define the bootstrap MSE as 
A small p-value obtained from equation (12) would imply that the \ MSE in,{T 1 } is "too high" and the structural model would fail to explain the variation in the patent protection data. The in-sample MSE and the bootstrap result are reported in Table 7 .
The p value for the \ MSE in,{T 1 } is 0.1010 and hence the null hypothesis that the MSE is not too high cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. This provides an evidence that the structural model is able to explain the variation in the data.
Out-of-Sample Prediction
To perform the out-of-sample prediction, we first of all have to establish that the coefficients are stable over the period used for the estimation and the period used for the prediction. An F-test on the equivalence of the time-specific fixed effect coefficients over the period of 1980-1990 (H 0 : β 0,80 = β 0,85 = β 0,90 ) is not rejected. So we can assume that the structural coefficients are stable over the period 1980-1990 and we can proceed to perform out-of-sample prediction.
In this paper, we use the rolling window approach to examine the one-period ahead prediction performance. We first estimate the structural model using the data of 1980 and 1985 and perform out-of-sample prediction for 1990. The estimated MSE ( \ MSE out,90 ) equals 0.0229 (see Table 7 ). It is quite close to the MSE when we did an in-sample prediction for the whole period of 1980-1990. This is consistent with our conjecture that the countries are all playing a non-cooperative game before the TRIPS Agreement was signed in 1994. We then try to predict the levels of patent protection for different countries in 1995 assuming the countries are still playing a non-cooperative game. Since the TRIPS Agreement may introduce a major change from non-cooperative to more cooperative behavior, we expect the MSE of the out-of-sample prediction for 1995 using the estimates from 1985 and 1990 to be significantly higher. The prediction results reported in Table 7 show that this is indeed the case. The estimated MSE for 1995 ( \ MSE out,95 ) is equal to 0.0301, which is more than thirty percent higher than that for the out-of-sample prediction for 1990. To formally test whether the out-of-sample prediction for 1990 is significantly better than the prediction for 1995, we use the test statistic of White (2000) which is defined as:
This can be evaluated using the bootstrap method again. We re-sample the data for many times to get a set of bootstrapped test statistics for bs = 1, 2, ....., B:
H bs,n = e δ bs √ n where e δ bs is the re-centered value of the bootstrap version of b δ :
Since Hansen (2003) proves that using h( b δ) = b δ as originally suggested by White will cause finite sample power problems, he suggests using the following truncated function:
To test if the out-of-sample prediction for 1990 is significantly better than the prediction for 1995 (i.e. whether the null hypothesis H 0 : MSE out,90 ≥ MSE out,95 can be rejected), we compare the test statistic H n with the set of bootstrapped test statistic H bs,n to obtain the p-value for testing the null hypothesis. The p value is calculated as:
A p-value close to 0 would mean the rejection of the null hypothesis. As reported in Table 7 , b δ = \ MSE out,95 − \ MSE out,90 = 0.0072 and its p value is 0.0750, so the null hypothesis is rejected at 10% level of significance and we conclude that the out-of-sample prediction for 1990 significantly out-perform the out-of-sample prediction for 1995.
In addition, we expect the actual patent protection after the TRIPS Agreement was signed will be in general higher than the predicted patent protection of the non-cooperative game model. To study this, we calculate the percentage of observations which have a higher patent protection than what is predicted by the non-cooperative game model (P i,.
). The results in Table 9 show that it is 55.73% for the out-of-sample prediction of 1990 but jumps significantly to 68.51% (78.68%) for the out-of-sample prediction of 1995 (2000). This confirms our conjecture that more countries behaved more cooperatively after the TRIPS agreement was signed.
Extension: Effects of Trade on the interdependence of IP protection
One key element of the Grossman and Lai model is the interdependence of IP protection among countries. This intensity of dependence of country i's degree of IP protection on the degree of IP protection of country k is captured by the term w ik in equation (5), which is derived based on free trade among all countries. Suppose we take into account the existence of trade barriers between countries, how should we modify the expression for w ik in (6)? A simple way to take into account trade barriers between countries is to adjust w ik according to the propensity of country k to import goods from i, as well as the propensity of country i to import from k. This is because the importance of country k as a market for innovative goods all over the world has to be adjusted by how easy foreign goods are imported into the country, which is positively related to country k's propensity to import. Moreover, w ik should also be adjusted to capture the fact that B i in equation (6) is positively related to country i's propensity to import. 7 Thus, w ik should be positively related to both i's propensity to import from k and k's propensity to import from i.
To calculate the propensity to import, we do not use any tariff or trade-barriers data, as tariff by itself is considered as an insufficient measure of overall trade protection, while availability of reliable measures on non-tariff barriers is very limited. Moreover, general measures of non-tariff barriers may not be appropriate for the circumstances. Therefore, we develop a measure of propensity to import based on the actual data on trade flows and production. To derive the augmented model, we first of all define a few variables. Let η ji be the fraction of goods invented in country j that are sold in i, η ii be the fraction of goods invented in country i that are sold in i (it is not necessarily equal to one as some goods that are invented end up do not have markets), and Im ij be the value of trade flow from country i to country j in patent-sensitive goods. If there is no overlap of inventions between any two countries, then
Moreover,
From equation (13) we can write
From equations (14), we have
If we define k's propensity to import from i (Λ ik ) as the ratio
Eqt. (17) indicates that k's propensity to import from i can be measured using the trade flow from i to k (Im ik ), the total inventions of economy i and k (I i and I k ) as well as the total consumption and imports of economy k (Con k and Im k ) on which we have reliable data. The variable Λ ii is by definition equal to one.
{Λ ik } k6 =i and {Λ ki } k6 =i are then used to construct three alternative measures that capture three aspects of the extent of trade relationship between country i and k. The three measures include:
(i) a measure of the importance of country k as an importer of goods from country i
(ii) a measure of the importance of country k as an exporter of goods to country i
(iii) an average of measures (i) and (ii)
In the extended spatial model, the weight {w ik } k6 =i that governs the interaction of patent protection between country i and k are augmented by these three alternative measures. The spatial model is thus modified from (5) to
where w 0 ik has three specifications:
The weights w The estimation results using the output measure of innovative capability are given in Table (10) to Table ( 12) , corresponding to the three specifications of the augmented model (model (i) to (iii)). The result for model (iii) using the input measure of innovative capability is given in Table 13 . 
Appendix A: Derivation of the Spatial Model
We hereby derive the structural equation used in the estimation by linearizing the nonlinear structural equation (3) . In this appendix, we show the detail steps in the linearization.
Equation (3) gives
which is equivalent to
with
Equation (18) involves two terms. The first term θ 1 [1 −
] mainly captures the impact of market size and innovative capability on the equilibrium patent protection. This term is independent of the patent protection in other countries ({P k } k6 =i ). To simplify the notation, we denote this term by P 0i
. The second term is
P k which measures the extent of interaction between the patent protection in country i (P i ) and the patent protection in other countries ({P k } k6 =i ). The extent of interdependence of patent protection is governed by the weight w ik =
, which can be easily shown to be directly related to country k's relative market size
and innovative capability (I k ). 9 Using these notations, equation (18) can be written as:
The positive relationship between w ik and I k can be easily shown by calculating ∂(
which is strictly positive.
We linearize the term P 0i
around the mean values of the variates
by using a first order Taylor's series expansion in order to investigate how this term reacts to changes in market size and innovative capability. We denote the mean values of m i and l i by m and l respectively. We keep the second term associated with the interaction of patent protection across countries in its original form without linearizing it because the structural model gives specific weights w ik to the patent protection of different partners k. These weights are employed in the estimation of the structural model. Given the weights, equation (18) indicates that the patent protection of country i (P i ) is linear in the weighted patent protection of its partner countries ({P k } k6 =i ).
The linearized version of equation (3) is thus
Evaluating the first order partial derivatives at the points m and l, we get
Hence the linearized version of equation (3) can be written as
This is specified as equation (4) in Section 2. The structural model indicates that β 1 < 0, β 2 > 0 and ρ > 0.
Appendix B: Procedures for Estimating the Spatial Model
The model is AP = Xβ+ρW b P b + ε and the full maximum likelihood is
where A = (1 − ρW) and ε i ∼ N(0, σ 2 ). The maximization procedure for the parameters
0 can be simplified to a maximization problem in ρ only by using the following steps stated in Anselin (1988) Chapter 12:
where X is a (N − 1) × k matrix with k being the number of explanatory variables and W b P b is a (N − 1) × 1 vector. The estimator of β is given by the first k elements of the following vector: 
Further application of the first order conditions and taking into account the auxiliary residuals yields the estimate for the error variance σ 2 as:
Again, this estimate can be readily obtained once a value for ρ has been determined.
4. Substitution of the estimates of β and σ 2 into the likelihood results in a concentrated likelihood of the following form:
where C is the usual constant. This expression is a nonlinear function in one parameter only, ρ, and can be easily maximized by means of numerical techniques.
The ML estimates are asymptotically efficient. This means they achieve the CramerRao lower variance bound, given by the inverse of the information matrix: [I(θ)]
using standard numerical function of GAUSS.
Appendix C: Description of Data
This section describe in more detail how we come up with the data for market size and innovative capability (output measure is patent count; input measure is scientist and engineers as a percentage of labor force) that we actually used in the regressions. The market size variable is measured in billion USD. The patent count is measured in 10,000.
The The sector-specific bilateral import data used in the augmented model is also taken from the Industrial Demand-Supply Database of UNESCO. 10 The R 2 in the regressions are close to 0.9.
Appendix D: Bootstrap of the MSE
The algorithm of the bootstrap scheme is described below. Let b θ = g(X) be the estimator of θ based on the data set X = {X 1 , X 2 , ....., X n }. The pseudo data series
bs n } is generated by drawing with replacement from the actual sample of size n. When the pseudo data series is generated, we compute b θ bs = g(X bs ). Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. The variable φ is the number of patents granted to domestic residents and Con is the market size of the patent sensitive industries. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. The variable φ is the number of patents granted to domestic residents and Con is the market size of the patent sensitive industries. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. The variable SciEngLF is the share of scientists and engineers in the labor force and Con is the market size of the patent sensitive industries. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. The variable φ is the number of patents granted to domestic residents and Con is the market size of the patent sensitive industries. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. The variable φ is the number of patents granted to domestic residents and Con is the market size of the patent sensitive industries. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. The variable φ is the number of patents granted to domestic residents and Con is the market size of the patent sensitive industries. Note: The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. "**" means the t statistic is significant at the 5% level and "*" means the t statistic is significant at the 10% level. The variable SciEngLF is the number of patents granted to domestic residents and Con is the market size of the patent sensitive industries. 
